In studies of group decision-making it is often found that the group choice differs from the average of the individual members' choices. This is especially true of studies on decisions made under uncertainty which involve risk. Normally, in these studies, first observed are choices of single individuals, who are then formed into groups for the purpose of coming to a joint decision. The decisions of these groups often seem to be at variance with the average of individual decisions.
Two components of the difference between individual and group choices were previously distinguished (Zajonc, Wolosin, Wolosin & Sherman, 1968 , 1969 . First, it is possible that individual choice preferences change when people act in groups. In fact, theories which attempt to explain the so-called "risky shift" phenomenon limit themselves almost exclusively to this component factor and seek to isolate its causes. One theory holds that in groups, responsibility for the decision can be diffused among the individuals ( Wallach, Kogan & Bern, 1964) ; others hold that the group provides the individuals with knowledge about cultural values regarding the alternatives (Brown, 1965; Stoner, 1968) or that he becomes more familiar with the decision problem (Bateson, 1966; Flanders & Thistlethwaite, 1967) ; or that some members are more influential than others (Clausen, 1965; Wallach, Kogan & Burt, 1968) . Each of these theories assumes that if there is a change from individual to group decision-making, something happens to individual preferences for the choice alternatives when the choices are made jointly and in a group setting.
The second component factor of the difference between individual and group decisions, which is independent of the first, focuses on the ways in which individual choices are combined to form a joint decision. A difference between the average of individual choices and the joint decision can be obtained without any change in individual preferences (Zajonc, Wolosin, Wolosin & Sherman, 1968) . For instance, if there are two alternative courses of action, A and B, and if, on the average, the individual members' preference of A is 70%, then a group composed of these individuals and observing the majority rule will choose A with a likelihood greater than .7, without any of the members changing their choice preferences. But if the group operates under unanimity then the likelihood of such a group choosing A is much smaller than .7. Various group decision schemes were compared by Smoke and Zajonc (1962) in terms of their formal properties, and it was clear from the analysis that a variety of discrepancies between the average of individual choices and the joint decision can be obtained all with the individual choice preferences remaining constant. These discrepancies depend only on the group decision scheme.
In all studies on risky shift known to the authors (including those carried out by them) these two components of the discrepancy between individual and group choices are allowed to vary simultaneously and are confounded. In some experiments the group is instructed to reach "consensus" as, for instance, in the early study by Wallach and Kogan (1965) , and in others such requirement is not made explicit, although the group is expected to come up with a single choice nevertheless, The method of arriving at "consensus" or the single choice is usually left to the group. One believes that these groups generally observe the majority rule, but we have no hard information to support this conjecture. Hence, if change does occur, it is impossible to determine whether it occurred because of changes in individual choice preferences. because of a particular decision scheme adopted, or because of an interplay between the two components.
The purpose of this study is to examine whether changes in individual choice preferences do occur in groups when group decision schemes are strictly controlled.
If we had control over the decision scheme which ZAJONC, WOLOSIN, AND WOLOSIN combined the individual preferences of each member into a group decision it would be possible to separate the effects of pooling from the effects of group-produced changes in choice preferences. In the study reported here, individuals and groups are confronted with a two-choice situation where one event occurs twice as often as another and where a correct prediction of the rare event brings about a payoff that is twice as high as the payoff for a correct prediction of the frequent event. According to previous conventions, the prediction of the rare event constitutes a risky response while the prediction of the frequent event a conservative response. Groups which make decisions according to a majority rule are compared with groups which make decisions according to unanimity favoring risk (i.e., the infrequent event) or according to what has been previously called the "minimal quorum" (Smoke & Zajonc, 1962) . That is, in the first case the group as a whole makes a risky choice if more than half of its members make risky choices. In the second case the group as a whole makes a risky choice if and only if all members make risky choices, and a conservative choice otherwise.
In the third case (minimal quorum) the group as a whole makes a risky choice if at least one member makes a risky choice. If no member chooses the rare event, the group decision favors the conservative alternative.
A second purpose of this study is to provide a further validation for a model of group decision-making under risk presented earlier (Zajonc, Wolosin, Wolosin & Sherman, 1969 In front of you, yen see two lights. Every 7 set, one or the other will come on. You also see two response plates. During each 7-set interval, you are to press one plate or the other to anticipate which light will come on. If you press the left plate and the left light comes on, YOLI win 1 cent (2 cents).
If you press the right plate and the right light comes on, you win 2 cents ( 1 cent).
If you press one plate and the opposite light comes on, you win nothing. Also, if you fail to press within the 7-set interval you win nothing. At the end of the 180 trials. subjects in the Individual-Individual (I-I) treatment were told that the first part of the experiment was over. They were then taken out of their cubicles by the experimenter and allowed to relax for about 3 or 4 min. However, they were not permitted to speak to one another. After the rest period, they were taken back to their cubicles and they continued as previously for another set of 180 trials. In the remaining treatments subjects worked in groups of three during the second set of 180 trials.
I-Al Treatment.
At the end of 180 trials, subjects in the Individual-Majority Vote (I-M ) treatment were told that the first part of the experiment was over. The experimenter then met all three subjects and led them to a room equipped with apparatus identical to that which they had used alone. Taped instructions were again issued over the intercom: Results are reported in percentages of risky choices. Table 1 shows these choices for the control (I-I) and the three experimental (I-U, I-MQ, and I-M) conditions for both sessions of the experiment. In the experimental conditions, scores during the first session were the average percentage of risky choices made by the group members individually, and in the second session, they were the percentage of group decisions for the risky alternative. As in our earlier studies, data from the control condition were aggregated into random sets of three-man statisticized "groups"; responses of these "groups" were averaged for both sets of 180 trials.
An analysis of variance was carried out with treatments as the between-subjects factor and trial blocks (with the sessions nested within blocks)
as the within-subject factor. For the purposes of this analysis degrees of freedom in the error term were reduced because of the grouping of individual scores in the second session of the I-I condition. The analysis showed significant overall effects of trial blocks (F( 11,308) = 8.00, p < .OOl) and sessions (F( 1,308) = 52.50, p < .OOl). There was also a significant interaction between treatments and sessions ( F (3,308) = 4.38, p < ,001). All groups showed declines in risktaking (i.e., shifts in the conservative direction). The smallest decline occurred in the I-MQ treatment, while the largest decline was shown by I-U groups.
Because of the significant interaction between sessions and treatments, simple effects tests (as outlined by Winer, 1962, pp. 310-311) were carried out. These tests showed that choices in the first session differed significantly from choices in the second session (at the .Ol level or better) in the I-M and I-U treatments, but also in the control (I-I) treatment.' Only in the I-MQ treatment was the decline in risk-taking nonsignificant. Furthermore, the 4 treatments did not differ among themselves for the first 180 trials ( F( 3,21) < 1.00) ; the differences among them in the second session are only marginally significant ( F( 3,21) = 2.56, .lO > p > .05). Table 1 also shows percentages of risky choices made by individuals when in groups. These data were analyzed by analysis of variance similar to the one described above and including the first 180 trials, except that the error term maintained its full number of degrees of freedom. As before, significant effects for trial blocks (F( 11,1012) = 10.62, p < .OOl) and sessions (F( 1,1012) = 83.24, p < .OOl) occurred, and there was a significant interaction between sessions and treatments (F(3,1012) = 5.41, p < .OOl). Simple effects tests were carried out. They indicate that while individual choices in the first session did not vary significantly as a function of treatment (F( 3,92) < 1.00)) they did vary significantly in the second half of the experiment ( F( 3,92) = 6.68, p < .Ol). We note from Table 1 that within experimental treatments, substantial decreases in average risktaking occurred. These changes were greatest in the I-MQ treatment (F( lJO12) = 28.54, p < .OOl), somewhat smaller but still significant in the I-U treatment (F( lJO12) = 5.49, p < .05), and least of all in the I-M treatment (F( 1,1012) = 2.25, ns). On the other hand, there was a significant decline in risk in the control (I-I) treatment (F( lJO12) = 13.75, p < .OOl),
Group Decision Schemes
It will be of interest to examine the present data in the light of the decision model presented in the earlier publication (Zajonc et at., 1969) . This parameter-free model assumes that, given two alternative events, A and B, occurring with the probabilities p(A) and p( B ) with p(A) > p(B), the individual can find himself at the onset of any trial in any of three mutually exclusive states: (a) he is certain that A will occur and equally certain that B will not occur; (b) he is certain that B will occur ' The reason why there is a significant difference between the first and second 180 trials even in the I-I condition is that during the early trials individual choices hover around 50% before reaching an asymptote which is roughly the one that is maintained during the second 180 trials. Total rather than asymptotic performance was observed during the first 180 trials so that the data from the first and the second 180 trials can be based on the same number of observations. and equally certain that A will not occur; (c) he is uncertain which of the two events will occur. These three states can be simply called A, B, and A U B. An individual's probability of being in a given state is assumed to correspond to the objective probability of the given event.
Thus, for example, his probability of being in state A, P(A), is equal to the probability that A will occur times the probability that B will not occur; his probability of being in state B, P(B), is the converse; and his probability of being in state A U B, P( A U B), is the remainder. For the .67-.33 event probabilities used in the present experiment
= .ll; and P(A U B) = 1 -P(A) + P(B) = .45.
As in previous experiments, in the present one the subjects are required to predict either A or B and they cannot declare uncertainty. Hence, states A and B are stable, and when in these states the individual will make the response "A" or "B," respectively, before the trial terminates. But A U B is unstable, and the rules of the experiment require him to move from A U B to another of two states, A or B. It is thus assumed that the individual who is in state A U B at the onset of the trial will move to A or to B. For reasons discussed in the previous publication, the probabilities of moving to A or to B from A U B are not proportional to the probabilities associated with the events A or B. but they are proportional to the payoffs associated with these events. Hence, in the present case the individual who is in A U B will move twice as often to B than to A because the payoff for B is 2 cents and for A only 1 cent. These values average to 43.5% risky choices, a figure not too far removed from that predicted by the model. According to the decision rules required in the I-MQ and I-U treatments the model would predict 1 -.5933 = .792 risky choices in the I-MQ treatment and .4073 = 967 risky choices in the I-U treatment. For the I-M treatment we would have to predict that the group makes a risky choice when either all three group members are in state B (which is equal to .067) or when two of them are in state B and one in state A (which is equal to .296). Hence, the probability that the group will choose the risky alternative when operating under the majority rule is predicted to be .363.
This last figure is again quite close to the one obtained in the I-M treatment, namely .39 (see Table 1 ). A conservative shift is predicted by the model when the group operates by the majority rule, and such a shift is obtained. The predictions for the I-MQ and I-U treatments, however, are utterly incorrect. The predicted probability of risky choices of ,792 overestimates the I-MQ performance by nearly forty points, and the predicted probability of .067 risky choices underestimates the obtained performance of I-U groups by nearly thirty points. How can these discrepancies be explained? Two possibilities exist. First, we can assume that individual choice preferences remain stable when subjects move from the alone condition to groups operating under the majority rule. But they change dramatically when individuals move to groups operating under unanimity or quorum. This conjecture, however, is contradicted by the evidence. It is seen in Table 1 that there is indeed a drop in risky choices for individuals going into I-MQ groups. But the change is negligible for individuals joining I-U groups. Moreover, the drop in individual risk-taking in the I-MQ treatment is not sufficient to explain the obtained results in this treatment. Since 33.2% of individual choices are risky choices (see Table l ), then we would expect in the I-MQ condition 1 -(1 -.332)" = .702 such group choices. This figure is somewhat smaller than the .792 predicted by the initial probabilities but still quite out of the range of the data.
The answer must lie, therefore, in the frequencies with which the various combinations of individual choices occur in the group setting. There are four such group states, AAA, AAB, ABB, and BBB, where each letter represents the terminal state in which one of the group members finds himself on the given trial. We assumed that the individuals make their decisions independently of others when in groups, and this assumption was tenable for the previous experiments on individual and group risk-taking and for the present I-M treatment, and even if it was not tenable, the predictions made under this assumption were not far from the observed results. But it is clearly not tenable for the I-U and I-MQ treatments. Table 3 shows the proportion of trials on which the four group states occurred in the four treatments and their predicted proportions when independence of choices is assumed and the choices are predicted by the terminal probabilities given by the parameter-free model.
It can be seen from Table 3 that there are indeed striking departures from the expected probabilities in the I-U and I-MQ treatments. These departures are in the direction of increased occurrence of unanimities. The model predicts that there would be 27% unanimities, 29% favoring the frequent and 7% favoring the infrequent alternative.
In the I-M treatment there is a tendency for these unanimities to be somewhat larger. However, in the I-U and I-MQ treatments these unanimities occur with an overwhelming frequency. In the I-U groups we have 84% and in I-MQ we have 83% unanimities, which are far above the expected percentages. It is also seen from Table 3 that the unanimities in the I-U groups favor the risky alternative more than they do in the I-MQ groups. It is therefore in this manner that the groups can maintain a level of risk-taking which the individual members consider acceptable, and which do not require the individuals to drastically change their own choice preferences.
DISCUSSION
As in the previous study on risk-taking in a two-choice situation (Zajonc et al., 1968) in which the probabilities of the two alternatives were .6 and .4, the present experiment demonstrated a shift toward conservatism.
But the significance of this shift is somewhat ambiguous because the I-I subjects also decreased their level of risk-taking during the second 180 trials. The parameter-free model was found again to ZAJONC, WOLOSIN, AND WOLOSIN predict individual risk-taking fairly reasonably. Also successful was the prediction to group risk-taking when the groups operated under the majority rule. The model predicted a conservative shift for I-M groups and a conservative shift did occur that was numerically not far removed from the predicted value. But, the data from the I-U and I-MQ treatments bore no resemblance to the predicted values.
Of course, it would be quite surprising if the parameter-free model did make accurate predictions for the I-U and the I-MQ cases. It would not be expected that individuals who settled on about 40% of risk-taking would accept 7% when they join a group working under the unanimity principle, or 80% when they work under minimal quorum rule. In fact, one of the purposes of introducing these treatments was to discover departures from the parameter-free model which would allow us to search for useful parameters.
It was initially expected that these parameters would pertain to the individual choice behavior, because that is where the main changes were anticipated. But we note that there were no dramatic changes in individual choice preferences when these choices were made in groups. While there was indeed some decline in individual choice preferences for the risky alternative in the three group treatments, this decline was not significant in groups reaching decisions by majority rule, and it was no larger than among subjects continuing to make decisions individually in I-U and I-MQ treatments.
The data then offer an indication that the individual members are quite resistant to changing their choice preferences. And when the individual maintains his choice preference the majority scheme leaves him with group choices that are not far removed from his own. He chooses the risky alternative 40.7% of the time when working alone, and a strict majority rule, with group members choosing independently of each other, predicts 36.3% risky choices made by the group. This represents less than a 5% shift, a change which is evidently quite tolerable. There must be a range of risk-taking which the person finds acceptable, whether he works alone or in groups. If he wants to remain within this range of risky choices when in a group which reaches decisions by unanimity, he must adjust his voting behavior. He can no longer predict his A's and B's as previously because other things held constant, the probability of a three-man group reaching a unanimous decision that favors the risky alternative is .43, which is very low indeed." It appears from the results that not only does the individual maintain his own choice preference within a narrow range when in a group, but somehow his group generates joint decisions which also lie within the range of risk acceptable to him. Table 3 reveals how this consequence is achieved. It is significant that the sums of the AAA and AAB states are fairly similar across the various treatments. The sum of the proportions of these two states as predicted by the parameter-free model is .63. The proportions obtained for the I-M, I-U, and I-MQ treatments were .61, 59, and .67. Of course, in the I-M treatment this sum consists of .27 for the AAA state and 34 for the AAB state, while we have .49 for AAA and .lO for AAB in the I-U groups, and .58 for AAA and .09 for AAB in the I-MQ groups. Similar effects obtain for the sums of the BBB and ABB states. It would appear, therefore, that in groups operating under unanimity and under the minimal quorum, when there are two choices for a given alternative, the probability of the third choice favoring that alternative is enhanced.
Let us first look at the I-U treatment. For any subject who has not yet made a decision, the probability that the two remaining group members have both chosen the infrequent alternative is, according to the predicted terminal probability, .40? = -17. His own probability of being in state B is .407. Simply suppose that he is the last to vote one third of the time. Suppose further that when last and when the other two members have both voted B he will always vote B. Since he doesn't wish to abandon his own individual choice preference, which according to the model is .407, he will be able to contribute only $2 of his B-votes, because he is third only $$ of the time. We have .17 + $5 (.407) = .31. The data show a value .04 higher.
It should be noted at this point that as in the I-U treatment, there is pressure toward unanimity in the I-MQ treatment as well. Here the group choice is for B unhs all vote for A. In these groups it is the likelihood of the conservative choice which would be depressed to about .2 had all three members retained their independence and their initial choice preferences.
If this level of conservatism is too low, or putting it otherwise, if the resulting level of group risk is beyond the acceptable range, there will be pressure on the individual who hasn't yet voted and who is confronted by two A votes to vote for A also. That such pressures toward unanimity exist is clearly evident from Table 3 . The I-U treatment has the greatest proportion of BBB states and the I-MQ treatment has the largest proportion of AAA states.
Let us then proceed with the I-MQ treatment in the same way as we did in the case of the I-U treatment. .55. This would be the predicted incidence of AAA states. The observed proportion of these states in the I-MQ treatment is not far removed, .58. The proportion of B group choices in the I-MQ treatment is strictly dependent on the proportion of AAA group states, because, according to the minimal quorum rule, the group votes B when at least one of its members votes for B. The predicted proportion of B group choices for the I-MQ treatment is thus 1 -55 = .45, which exceeds the data by .03.
It is of interest to note from Table 3 that the tendency toward unanimity generalizes to the irrelevant alternative as well. In the I-U treatment it is quite immaterial whether there are many or few AAA occurrences in the group. Yet the data show that in this treatment the preponderance of AAA states exceeded the expected value by a considerable margin. The same is true of the BBB states in the I-MQ treatment. Here it is also inconsequential whether there are many or few BBB states. Yet the proportion of these states in the I-MQ groups was .25, which exceeds chance expectations by .I& To summarize then, the individual who finds himself a part of a joint decision team does not seem to be ready to abandon his idiosyncratic preferences. Nor is he ready to allow the group of which he is a member to make decisions which would deviate significantly from his own preferences. This seems to be the case where this is quite difficult as, for instance, in groups that operate under the unanimity rule. The individual solves his problems by a judicious distribution of his choices over trials. AI1 members of the group gauge their behavior so as to maximize unanimity when unanimity is the criterion of the group choice. We noted that in the I-U and the I-MQ treatments there were 84% and 83% of trials with unanimous choices. The remaining trials are apparently left for individuals to recapture their own idiosyncratic preferences. Thus the person gives up very little by joining the group that works under unanimity or the minimal quorum: he attempts to maintain his previous choice preference and he only abandons the freedom of selecting the trials on which he votes for A or B. Of course, in groups operating under majority rule he needn't abandon either his idiosyncratic choice preferences or the sequential pattern of these choices over trials. One should not mistake these pressures toward unanimity for conformity.
It is quite clear that the individual does not give up the independence of his choices-only the timing of these choices. Wallach and Mabli ( 1970) , using the standard choice dilemmas, also found little evidence of conformity effects in group risk taking. It should be noted, however, that other studies do indicate some tendencies toward uniformity or conformity, as there usually is a restriction of variance when individuals move from the solitary to the group condition.
Because the majority rule affords the person not only the freedom to retain his idiosyncratic choice preferences but also the freedom to select the occasions on which he will exercise one preference or another, it would seem that a group free to determine its own decision scheme would lock in 011 the majority process. In a recent study on binary choices in groups, Davis, Hornik, and Hornseth (1970) , have found that while the majority scheme is indeed among the preferred ones, groups they observed are sufficiently flexible so as to allow themselves to function on some occasions by other schemes as well.
Because a different decision task than that conventionally used in risky shift studies was examined in the present experiment, one should be cautious in attempting to generalize to group processes occurring when individuals work with choice dilemmas. Nonetheless, on the basis of these results there is also cause to doubt whether risky shifts (or conservative shifts) obtained with conventional materials can be explained entirely in terms of changes in individual risk preferences with rules whereby these individual preferences are combined into a joint choice totally ignored.
